Kurdish diplomacy unravels Ankara-Tehran conflict in Iraq

With Turkey achieving a clear victory in Syria after the ouster of Bashar al-Assad last December, the region seems poised for a major escalation in the rivalry between Ankara and Tehran. In Iraq, the repercussions could be significant, where the fall of Assad-a key ally within Tehran's "axis of resistance"-has been a major focus in the debate over the dismantling of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a largely Shiite force backed by Iran. This development, coupled with the loss of Syria as a "front line of defense," could significantly reduce Iran's regional influence.

In this context, Iraqi Kurdistan may become a critical arena in which Iran and Turkey compete-whether diplomatically, economically, or even security-wise.

Will Ankara support the dismantling of the PMF?

In light of rapid developments in the region, Turkey is seeking to push Iran toward a balanced repositioning in its favor, especially in Iraq. Despite recent U.S. demands to dismantle the PMF by integrating it into the Iraqi armed forces, Ankara's position on this issue remains unclear.

Turkey has a complex and shifting relationship with the Shia armed factions that make up the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). In 2017, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan labeled the PMF a terrorist organization, but the head of the commission, Faleh al-Fayyad, later visited Ankara and attended the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) congress in 2023. Although some PMF-affiliated factions have previously attacked Turkish bases in northern Iraq, these developments indicate a significant shift in relations from mutual hostility to strategic cooperation.

This change was accompanied by a shift in Ankara's strategy against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). With the limited success of Operation Claw-Lock in 2022, Turkey realized the limits of unilateral military action, prompting it to rapprochement with Baghdad and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This led to the signing of a security agreement with the Iraqi government in March 2024, which included the participation of PMU factions.

The Kurdish card is back on the table

Iran's military and strategic challenges-particularly after losing its Syrian ally-could redraw geopolitical calculations, reinforcing the importance of Iraqi Kurdistan. While Ankara and Tehran agree that the PKK is a common enemy, Turkey remains wary of Iran's support for PKK-linked Kurdish groups across the region, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Sulaymaniyah, as well as the PJAK's wing in Iran.

Ankara believes Tehran is supporting cross-border coordination between these factions, which could lead to a regional escalation. Turkish concerns were heightened after reports of communication between Iran's Quds Force and the People's Protection Units (YPG), the military wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with allegations that Iran agreed to provide the latter with 1,500 suicide drones to counter Turkish influence in Syria.

If these reports are true, it could inflame tensions between Ankara and the PUK, which is often accused of being a conduit for passing weapons to the SDF. Moreover, any military coordination between the PUK and Syrian Kurds could prompt Turkey's allies in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Erbil to take a hard line.

Can internal Kurdish diplomacy defuse tensions?

As the Iranian-Turkish rivalry escalates, Ankara has intensified its diplomatic efforts in Iraqi Kurdistan. On January 8, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani visited Ankara to discuss regional developments. Unconfirmed reports also indicated a meeting between Turkish officials and PUK leader Pavel Talabani in Baghdad, signaling Ankara's attempt to mend fences between the two main Kurdish parties.

A rare meeting between Barzani and Talabani took place on January 16, which may indicate the PUK's openness to discussing issues such as the PKK and the SDF. The same month, the party closed four cultural and media centers believed to be close to the PKK, which may be a gesture of goodwill toward Ankara and the KDP. That same month, the PUK also closed four cultural and media centers believed to be close to the PKK, which may be a goodwill gesture towards Ankara and the KDP.

All of Kurdistan is a theater of regional rivalry

Any improvement in relations between Kurdish parties could help Turkey relaunch the peace process with the PKK, as Ankara views Iraqi Kurdish leaders as potential mediators. KDP leader Masoud Barzani's meeting with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi in Erbil on Jan. 16 is seen as an attempt to explore the possibility of mediation, as well as to thwart any Iranian influence in the process.

The discussion between Abdi and Barzani also addresses how to integrate the SDF into Syria's new political structure and balance its strained relations with pro-Turkish Syrian Kurdish parties.

However, the success of these efforts depends heavily on developments in Syria, particularly with regard to the SDF's negotiations with Damascus regarding the integration of its forces into the Syrian National Army (SNA). If this process succeeds-especially if it is part of a peace deal between Ankara and the PKK-it could fundamentally change the geopolitical calculus for all parties involved.

While these developments may take the Kurdish card out of Iran's hands, they may also provoke Iranian reactions if a delicate balance is not maintained between all players. Nevertheless, recent moves by Ankara, Tehran and the Kurdish forces suggest that a new, perhaps more diplomatic, future may be on the horizon-if the cards are played smartly.